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Abstract
This experiment aimed to create a laboratory analogue of déjà vu. During hypnosis, one group
of high hypnotizables completed a puzzle game and then received a posthypnotic amnesia
suggestion to forget the game (PHA condition). Another group of highs were not given the
game, but received a posthypnotic familiarity suggestion that it would feel familiar (PHF
condition). After hypnosis, all participants were given the game and described their reactions
to it. Whereas 83% of participants in both condition passed their respective suggestions, more
in the PHF condition felt a sense of déjà vu. An EAT inquiry revealed that they experienced
sensory fascination and confusion about the source of familiarity, akin to everyday déjà vu.
These findings highlight the value of using hypnosis as a laboratory analogue of déjà vu and
provide a framework for investigating clinical manifestations of this phenomenon.
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Déjà Vu in the Laboratory:
A Behavioral and Experiential Comparison of
Posthypnotic Amnesia and Posthypnotic Familiarity
Déjà vu is the mysterious, fleeting sensation of having seen or lived unfamiliar
situations before. Déjà vu has been defined as “a clash between two simultaneous and
opposing mental evaluations: an objective assessment of unfamiliarity juxtaposed with a
subjective evaluation of familiarity” (Brown, 2004, p. 2). Thus, it involves an erroneous or
inappropriate feeling of familiarity for present information and/or events, combined with
awareness that this feeling of familiarity is incorrect. Although déjà vu is a fairly common
experience (Brown, 2004; Richardson & Winokur, 1967), it is highly unpredictable and
usually brief, making it difficult to investigate experimentally. To address this difficulty, in
this experiment we used hypnotic suggestions to create déjà vu in the laboratory. We
approached this research from a cognitive neuropsychological perspective (similar to the
approach taken by Moulin, Conway, Thompson, James, & Jones, 2005 and Moulin et al.,
2006) by adopting a case-study approach and focusing on a small number of carefully
selected high hypnotizable participants. This approach is also consistent with neuroimaging
work involving hypnosis (e.g., Barabasz & Barabasz, in press; Derbyshire, Whalley, Stenger,
& Oakley, 2004; Halligan, Athwal, Oakley, & Frackowiak, 2000; Oakley, in press; Rainville,
Duncan, Price, Carrier, & Bushnell, 1997; Raz, Fan, & Posner, 2005). Specifically, we
compared déjà vu like experiences following either a posthypnotic amnesia suggestion or a
posthypnotic familiarity suggestion.
Approximately 97% of the population have experienced déjà vu at least once and 67%
experience it regularly. Déjà vu is more common in younger people and is more likely to
occur when the person is fatigued or travelling (Richardson & Winokur, 1967). Experiences
of déjà vu can last from two to thirty seconds before dissipating with no untoward effects
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(Neppe, 1983). Déjà vu is characterised by both perceptual salience and confusion. The
following description captures the essence of the sensation: “hearing, touch and smell often
seem to intermingle in the déjà vu experiences. It is almost like photographic memory….as if
I was encountering a mini-recording in my head but trying to think ‘where have I come across
that before?’” (O'Connor & Moulin, 2006, p. 247).
Déjà vu was originally explained in terms of “optical pathway delay” (e.g. Osborn,
1884). According to this theory, one optical pathway lags behind the other, disrupting the
usual simultaneous visual input received by the brain. This results in two separate signals
reaching the brain, where the second signal is interpreted as “familiar”. This inappropriate
feeling of familiarity gives rise to the sensation of déjà vu. However, the optical pathway
delay account is inconsistent with findings that individuals who lack input from the optic
nerve (in particular forms of blindness) also experience déjà vu (O'Connor & Moulin, 2006)
and that déjà vu is experienced across multiple sensory modalities, not just vision. Instead,
recent research has indicated that the conscious experience of familiarity is associated with
activation of the medial temporal lobe (Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Vignal, Maillard,
McGonigal, & Chauvel, 2007). When a familiar stimulus is encountered, the medial temporal
lobe is activated appropriately, and a normal sensation of familiarity arises with
accompanying memories of previously experienced events. However, if the medial temporal
lobe is activated inappropriately in response to an unfamiliar stimulus, an individual may
experience familiarity without accompanying memories – producing the sensation of déjà vu
(Vignal et al., 2007). In other words, déjà vu is the consequence of a dissociation between two
normally congruent aspects of remembering – memory and familiarity.
Déjà vu can also take a more disruptive and debilitating clinical form, known as déjà
vecu. Déjà vecu was traditionally used as a term to describe events that felt as though they
had been “already lived through” (for information on a range of déjà vu experiences including
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déjà vecu, see Funkhouser, 1995). However, more recently it has been conceptualized as a
pathological form of déjà vu (Moulin et al., 2005). Déjà vecu is characterised by a persistent
and overwhelming sense of déjà vu for many experiences in daily life, which should not be
familiar to the sufferer. It has been primarily reported in individuals with dementia (Moulin et
al., 2005; Moulin et al., 2006) but it is also thought to occur in individuals with temporal lobe
epilepsy (Adachi et al., 1999), migraine (Sacks, 1970), and psychosis (Murai & Fukao, 2003).
Unlike déjà vu, déjà vecu has behavioral consequences. Patients believe that they have
previously experienced the situations and events that feel (falsely) familiar, so they withdraw
from any activity that feels familiar to them. Patients confabulate to explain such behavior,
justifying their sensations of familiarity with beliefs bordering on delusion. The case of
patient AKP illustrates these features well (Moulin et al., 2006). Following significant
memory problems, AKP was diagnosed with dementia. As his memory declined, AKP’s carer
noticed that he stopped reading the newspaper, an activity he’d always enjoyed as one of his
last links to the outside world. When questioned, AKP said that he didn’t want to read the
paper because he’d already read it. Whenever each day’s paper arrived, he said he’d read and
remembered every story it contained. But he hadn’t read the paper – he was experiencing déjà
vu. Ironically, although AKP’s dementia meant that he had difficulty remembering events he
had experienced, events that he had not experienced felt familiar. AKP not only went to great
lengths to justify these feelings – he claimed he had woken up early, walked to the newsagent
and read the paper there, before returning to bed – AKP changed his behavior in a way that
reduced the quality of his life.
There is clear value in investigating the nature of the mysterious, yet rather common,
experience of déjà vu and its relationship to the debilitating clinical condition of déjà vecu.
But, as noted above, déjà vu is not an easy phenomenon to investigate. Because déjà vu is
unpredictable, fleeting, and cannot be produced on demand, research has tended to rely on
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retrospective reports. While such reports yield important data, it is difficult to disentangle the
specific factors that trigger déjà vu. For instance, Linn (1953) noted that during World War II,
soldiers marching across Europe frequently experienced déjà vu. These sensations may have
been due to any number of factors – novel terrain, fatigue, stress – and the retrospective
reports themselves may have been unreliable. Additionally, the only current way to
investigate déjà vecu involves neuropsychological case-studies. A better solution would be to
develop the means to systematically investigate déjà vu in the laboratory.
In our view, hypnosis has the potential to provide a reliable laboratory analogue of
déjà vu. Hypnosis has been used instrumentally (Reyher, 1961) to successfully model a range
of clinical conditions, including dissociative disorders, conversation and somatoform
disorders and clinical delusions (Barnier, 2002; Barnier, McConkey, & Wright, 2004; Blum,
1975; Bryant & McConkey, 1989a, 1989b; Burn, Barnier, & McConkey, 2001; Cox &
Barnier, 2003; Halligan, Bass, & Wade, 2000; Noble & McConkey, 1995; Woody &
Szechtman, 2000; Zimbardo, Andersen & Kabat, 1981; for review, see Barnier & McConkey,
1999; Cox & Bryant, in press; Kihlstrom, 1979; Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988; Oakley, 2006).
Also, hypnotic suggestions have been used to create anomalous experiences (i.e., experiences
that are statistically uncommon, experiences that may not be uncommon but that deviate from
normal experience, and experiences that challenge standard explanations of reality; Cardena,
Lynn, & Krippner, 2000) that are conceptually similar to déjà vu (e.g., a positive visual
hallucination suggestion to see an object that is not present is conceptually similar to
experiencing a sense of familiarity for an event that has not been experienced), as well as to
create disjunctions between perception and awareness. For instance, Zimbardo et al. (1981)
gave participants a posthypnotic suggestion for deafness with or without accompanying
amnesia for the suggestion. Following hypnosis, participants who experienced deafness but
were amnesic for the suggestion (and the source of their deafness) scored higher on a measure
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of paranoia when confronted with two confederates apparently whispering, than did
participants who experienced deafness but remembered the suggestion (and were aware of the
source of their deafness). Thus, if hypnosis can produce a dissociation between perception and
awareness, it is just as likely to produce a dissociation between memory and familiarity,
similar to déjà vu (see also Sheehan, McConkey, & Cross, 1978).
Banister and Zangwill (1941) pioneered the use of hypnosis to experimentally create
déjà vu. Before a hypnotic induction, participants were shown a set of pictures. Following the
induction, they were administered a posthypnotic amnesia suggestion for these pictures. After
a deinduction, they were shown the pictures again. Approximately 30% of participants
reported a déjà vu-like experience for the pictures. However, Banister and Zangwill’s (1941)
use of posthypnotic amnesia is inconsistent with our current knowledge and understanding of
déjà vu. In this study, when participants were shown the pictures again after hypnosis, they
experienced an appropriate feeling of familiarity because they had encountered the pictures
previously (during hypnosis). However, the posthypnotic amnesia suggestion lead to an
erroneous belief that the pictures were new. Whereas these participants experienced true
familiarity for previously encountered stimuli, déjà vu involves false familiarity for stimuli
that has not been previously encountered.
The aim of the present study was to develop a laboratory analogue of déjà vu
consistent with our current understanding of déjà vu, involving false familiarity for an
unfamiliar stimulus. We compared déjà vu experiences following a posthypnotic amnesia
suggestion with déjà vu experiences following a posthypnotic familiarity suggestion. The
posthypnotic amnesia suggestion was based on Banister and Zangwill’s (1941) work. The
posthypnotic familiarity suggestion was based on work by O’Connor, Moulin, and Conway
(2007), which involved suggested familiarity for certain words. In their study, before a
hypnotic induction participants were shown a list of words. Following the induction, they
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were administered a posthypnotic suggestion that after hypnosis: (a) any words that were
surrounded by a green box would be accompanied by a vivid recollection of having seen and
read the word before, and (b) any words surrounded by a red box would simply feel familiar,
“You may not be able to say why, but words presented in a red frame will simply appear
familiar to you”. After a deinduction, participants were shown old and new words surrounded
by either a green, red, or blue box. Approximately 30% of participants reported a déjà vu-like
experience for the words. For instance, one said: “some words seemed a lot more familiar
than others, even though I wasn't sure they had appeared in the main word list”.
To extend O’Connor et al.’s (2007) promising posthypnotic familiarity method to
more complex experiences, as well as to compare it with Banister and Zangwill’s (1941)
posthypnotic amnesia method, in this experiment we tested 12 carefully screened, very
talented high hypnotizable participants. This small, select group was based on the case-study
approach typically seen in cognitive neuropsychological research. Following an hypnotic
induction, we gave half of the participants a behavioral task, a puzzle game, followed by a
posthypnotic amnesia suggestion: we suggested that after hypnosis they would not remember
having attempted the puzzle game during hypnosis (posthypnotic amnesia condition). The
other half of the participants did not attempt the puzzle game, but we gave them a
posthypnotic familiarity suggestion: we suggested that after hypnosis they would experience
the puzzle game as overwhelmingly familiar (posthypnotic familiarity condition). Following a
deinduction, we gave all participants the puzzle game – half again and half for the first time –
and asked for their reactions to the game.
Since déjà vu is a compelling private experience, we used multiple methods to index
participants’ reactions to these suggestions and to the puzzle game. We measured pass rates
for the suggestions, we noted whether participants completed the puzzle game and the time
they took to do it, and we asked for subjective ratings about the game. We also implemented
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Sheehan and McConkey’s (1982) Experiential Analysis Technique (EAT), which involves
videotaping the hypnosis session and the participant and an independent experimenter
watching it together in order to gain a deeper understanding of the individual’s behavioral and
subjective responding (for review, see McConkey, in press; Sheehan, 1991). In our
experiment, the EAT focused on the quality of participants’ experiences of familiarity or déjà
vu for the puzzle task, and how this compared to normal, everyday déjà vu.
We expected that our high hypnotizable participants would easily pass the amnesia
and familiarity suggestions, but that their experiences of the behavioral task would be quite
different. Whereas we expected that participants in the posthypnotic amnesia condition would
report little or no explicit memory for attempting the puzzle game, their responding and
comments might reflect implicit awareness of attempting the game during hypnosis.
Importantly, we did not expect these individuals to experience déjà vu as they attempted the
puzzle game after hypnosis. In contrast, we expected that participants in the posthypnotic
familiarity condition would report compelling experiences of familiarity, and perhaps déjà vu,
as they attempted the puzzle game for the first time after hypnosis.
Method
Participants and Design
We tested 12 (6 male, 6 female) very high hypnotizable individuals who were
undergraduate psychology students at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.
They participated in our experiment in return for either research credit of 2 hours or AUS$25
(if credit was not required). We carefully selected these participants on the basis of their
extremely high scores on a 10-item modified version of the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic
Susceptibility, Form A (HGSHS:A; Shor & Orne, 1962) and a 10-item tailored version of the
Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C (SHSS:C; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962).1
All participants scored in the range 8-10 on the HGSHS:A (M = 9.42, SD = 0.79) and 9-10 on
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the SHSS:C (M = 9.67, SD = 0.49). We randomly allocated 6 (3 male, 3 female) participants
into the posthypnotic amnesia condition (hereafter “PHA condition”) and six (3 male, 3
female) participants into the posthypnotic familiarity condition (hereafter “PHF condition”);
there was no significant difference in the hypnotizability scores of participants across these
conditions (all ts < 1.16, all ps > .260).
Materials
We used a video camera, focused on the participant throughout, and DVD recorder to
record both the hypnosis and EAT inquiry sessions onto DVD. We used a DVD player and
color monitor to play the recording of the hypnosis session to participants during the EAT
inquiry session and later to transcribe hypnosis and inquiry sessions for analysis.
We used two identical sets of a puzzle game, “Railroad Rush Hour”, set up on junior
level 5 as the behavioral task. We used one set during hypnosis (in the PHA condition) and
the second set after hypnosis (in the PHA and PHF conditions). The aim of the game is to
rearrange a number of pieces on a board so that one particular piece, the ‘little red engine’,
has a clear passage to the exit.
Procedure
We tested participants individually in two hour sessions, which involved a hypnosis
procedure, a posthypnotic interview, and an EAT inquiry. The hypnosis procedure and
posthypnotic interview were conducted by the first experimenter (the hypnotist) and the EAT
inquiry was conducted by a second, independent experimenter (the inquirer). Table 1 sets out
the experimental design.
Hypnosis procedure, including hypnotic puzzle game. Following informed consent, the
hypnotist told participants to make themselves comfortable and asked them about their
favorite suggestion from their previous (SHSS:C) hypnosis session. She then administered a
standard induction procedure (from the tailored SHSS:C; Hilgard, Crawford, Bowers, &
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Kihlstrom, 1979), followed by a number of suggestions to deepen hypnosis and build rapport,
which included a hand lowering suggestion, a favorite food hallucination, an identity delusion,
and the previously determined favorite suggestion.
After these suggestions, the hypnotist gave participants in the PHA condition the
puzzle game, which had previously been hidden from view. She explained the rules and goal
of the game. She drew participants’ attention to a number of details of the puzzle game, and
tested their understanding of the puzzle by pointing to two points on the puzzle-board. The
hypnotist’s verbatim instructions were:
In a moment, I will ask you to open your eyes slowly and to lean forward to look at
the puzzle board. When you open your eyes and look at the puzzle, you will notice the
colored train engines and train carriages on the grey board. When you open your eyes,
you will notice in particular, the little red engine and, to the right of the green engine,
the exit gate, sticking out from the side of the board. Now open your eyes slowly, lean
forward and look at the board. Do you see the board?
Now, close your eyes, lean back and as you listen to my voice, relax, think about the
grey board and the colorful train engines and train carriages. Your task will eventually
be to solve this puzzle, by moving the pieces around the board so that you can move
your piece, the little red engine, out of the exit gate and place it on the table to the
right of the exit gate. But when you next open your eyes, I want you just to lean
forward and put a finger from your left hand on the little red engine, and a finger from
your right hand on the exit gate. Now open your eyes slowly.
[Wait for participant to put fingers on engine and exit]
That’s great, now let your arms return to their original positions, lean back, close your
eyes and relax, still deeply hypnotized. Before you attempt the puzzle, I will tell you a
rule which you must obey when you are moving the engines and carriages around the
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board. You may only move the pieces one at a time, forwards, in the direction they are
facing, or backwards. Remember, you solve the puzzle by moving the little red engine
out of the exit gate. In a moment, I will ask you to solve the puzzle. This may take a
while, but as long as you obey the rule, you may move each piece as many times as
you need. As you move each piece on the board, you will continue to feel as deeply
relaxed and comfortably hypnotized as you feel now. I would now like you to open
your eyes slowly, lean forward, and solve the puzzle.
Participants then worked to solve the puzzle game. Task latency was recorded from
the moment they started to work on the puzzle until they moved the little red engine out of the
exit gate. If they did not complete the behavioral task within 3 minutes they were instructed to
stop trying (and task latency was recorded as 180 sec). Following this, the hypnotist hid the
puzzle game from view and administered a deepening suggestion. She then gave all
participants a mosquito hallucination suggestion before administering either the posthypnotic
amnesia suggestion or the posthypnotic familiarity suggestion.
For participants in the PHA condition, the hypnotist administered a specific
posthypnotic amnesia suggestion that targeted participants’ memory for the puzzle game
(which they attempted during hypnosis). The verbatim suggestion was as follows:
After you wake up, I will give you the puzzle task to do again. You will not recall
having done the task during hypnosis. As you lean forward to look at the task, you will
have no memory of having done this exact action before. When you notice the little
red engine and the exit gate, you will have no recollection of having looked at them
before, and you will feel as though you are noticing them for the first time. As you
look at the puzzle board, you will not remember having done the same thing before
during hypnosis. You will not be able to bring to mind that I had earlier explained the
aim of the puzzle task to you. Nor will you recall having previously placed your
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fingers on the little red engine and the exit gate. All of your thoughts and actions to do
with the task will be forgotten without difficulty. When you hear me explaining the
rule, you will have no memory of having listened to me tell you this exact rule before.
Even as I tell you to start the task and as you move the colored pieces, you will have
no recollection of having moved the engines and carriages before, in the exact same
way. As you hear the sounds of the pieces on the board and feel your changing
emotions as you solve the puzzle task, the sounds and emotions you experienced
previously during hypnosis will all be forgotten. It will be easy to forget all aspects of
having done the puzzle task before, until you hear me say “Now you can remember
everything”. Until then, you will not remember having done the task before.
For participants in the PHF condition, the hypnotist administered a specific
posthypnotic familiarity suggestion that targeted participants’ feelings of familiarity for the
puzzle game (which they would attempt after hypnosis). The verbatim suggestion was as
follows:
After you wake up, I will give you a puzzle task to do. You will feel as though you
have done the task before but you will not understand why you are having this feeling.
As you lean forward to look at the task, you will have an overwhelming and surprising
sense of familiarity – of having done this exact action before. When you notice the
little red engine and the exit gate, you will believe that you have seen them before. As
you look at the puzzle board, you will be overcome by an overwhelming sensation of
having done exactly the same thing before. You will have an overwhelming sensation
that I had earlier explained the aim of the puzzle task to you. You will even feel as
though you had previously placed your fingers on the little red engine and the exit gate
in the exact same way. All of your thoughts and actions to do with the task will be
surprisingly familiar. However, you will not remember that, during hypnosis, I
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suggested that you would feel this sensation of familiarity. When you hear me
explaining the rule, you will have an overwhelming feeling that you have listened to
me tell you this exact rule before. Even as I tell you to start the task and as you move
the colored pieces, you will experience a surprising feeling of having moved the
engines and carriages before in the exact same way. As you hear the sounds of the
pieces on the board and feel your changing emotions as you solve the puzzle task, you
will have an overwhelming feeling of having experienced these sounds and emotions
previously. These sensations of familiarity will feel both overwhelming and surprising
although you will not know why you are having these feelings until you hear me say
“Now everything feels normal”. Until then, you will feel as though you have done the
task before.
Finally, the hypnotist administered a standard hypnotic deinduction procedure (based on
Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) to all participants.
Posthypnotic interview, including posthypnotic puzzle game. Immediately following
the deinduction procedure the hypnotist asked participants about their experiences of hypnosis
from the induction to the mosquito hallucination. After at least two minutes of such
conversation, the hypnotist presented participants with the second set of the puzzle game and
explained the rules and goal of the game. These instructions were identical to the instructions
given during hypnosis to those in the PHA condition.
Participants then worked to solve the puzzle game. As during hypnosis, task latency
was recorded from the moment they started to work on the puzzle until they moved the little
red engine out of the exit gate. If they did not complete the game within 3 minutes they were
instructed to stop trying (and task latency was recorded as 180 sec). Following this, the
hypnotist questioned participants about their experience of the puzzle game, focusing
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especially on either memories or feelings of familiarity for the puzzle task. These questions
were deliberately ordered from general to specific:
1) Tell me, what were you thinking and feeling as you were doing the puzzle task?
2) Do you have any memory of having seen or done this puzzle task before?
3) Did you feel at all familiar with any aspects of the puzzle task?
4) Did you notice anything unusual about how you felt when you were carrying out
the puzzle task?
5) Could you relate any feelings you experienced during the task to sensations you
may have felt in everyday life?
6) Did you experience the sensation of déjà vu at all during the task?
7) Did you ever have the feeling that you could predict what would happen next?
Finally, the hypnotist cancelled the posthypnotic suggestions. For participants in the
PHA condition, the hypnotist said “Now you can remember everything”. For participants in
the PHF condition, the hypnotist said “Now everything feels normal”.
EAT inquiry. The hypnotist invited the independent inquirer into the room and left.
The inquirer told participants that together they would watch a DVD recording of the
hypnosis session that he or she had just experienced. The inquirer left the decision to stop the
videotape to participants. However, the inquirer stopped the recording and asked participants
to comment on their experiences if they did not comment spontaneously on: the hypnotic
puzzle game (for those in the PHA condition), the posthypnotic suggestion (both PHA and
PHF versions), and the posthypnotic puzzle game (for all).
For participants in the PHA condition, during playback of the hypnotic puzzle game
the inquirer asked questions such as: “What thoughts and feelings did you have while you
were doing the task the first time?” The inquirer also asked participants to rate how easy or
difficulty they found completing the task (1 = very easy, 7 = very difficult). During playback
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of the posthypnotic amnesia suggestion, the inquirer asked questions such as: “What went
through your mind as you listened to the suggestion?” and “What did you expect to happen
after hypnosis?” During playback of the posthypnotic puzzle game the inquirer asked
questions such as: “What thoughts did you have while you were doing the task this time?” and
“Did you notice anything unusual about how you felt when you were doing the task?” The
inquirer also asked participants to rate again how easy or difficulty they found completing the
task.
For participants in the PHF condition, during playback of the posthypnotic familiarity
suggestion, the inquirer asked questions such as “What went through your mind as you
listened to the suggestion?” and “What did you expect to happen after hypnosis?” During
playback of the posthypnotic puzzle game the inquirer asked questions such as: “What
thoughts did you have while you were doing the task?” and “Did you notice anything unusual
about how you felt when you were doing the task?” The inquirer also asked participants to
rate how easy or difficulty they found completing the task (1 = very easy, 7 = very difficult).
Finally, the inquirer answered participants’ questions and debriefed them.
Results
Response to Suggestion
We scored participants in the PHA condition as passing the suggestion if during the
posthypnotic interview they reported no memory of completing the puzzle game (for the first
time) during hypnosis. We scored participants in the PHF condition as passing the suggestion
if during the posthypnotic interview they reported that the puzzle game (which they
completed for the first time after hypnosis) felt familiar.²
In both the PHA and PHF conditions, five (83.3%) participants passed the suggestion
and one did not. When the hypnotist asked participants in the PHA condition “Do you have
any memory of having seen or done this puzzle task before?” they made comments such as
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“…only when I was a child. My brother had one so we used to play with that on long car
trips” and “I’ve done it before when I was a kid. I don’t know if it was that exact one but it
was the same kind of thing.” When the hypnotist asked participants in the PHF condition “Did
you feel at all familiar with any aspects of the puzzle task?” they made comments such as “I
felt like I’d done that exact same thing before” and “like the engine … how it feels and how it
slides on the board. It just seems familiar.”
Completing the Puzzle Task
We scored participants as completing the puzzle game if they moved the ‘little red
engine’ through the exit gate within 3 minutes. We also recorded latency to complete the
puzzle; failure to complete was recorded as 180 sec.
Table 2 presents the number (and percentage) of participants who completed the
puzzle game and their average latency to complete. Time 1 refers to participants’ first attempt
at the puzzle. For participants in the PHA condition, Time 1 was during hypnosis and Time 2
was after hypnosis. For participants in the PHF condition, Time 1 was after hypnosis. In the
PHA condition, all participants completed the puzzle within 3 minutes by their second attempt
(after hypnosis). In the PHF condition, all but one participant completed the task within 3
minutes on their first and only attempt (after hypnosis). Participants in the PHA condition
tended to complete the puzzle more quickly at Time 2 compared to Time 1, t(5) = 2.39, p
= .06. Not surprisingly, they were quicker on their second attempt. However, participants in
the PHF condition completed the puzzle task in about the same time as participants in the
PHA condition (Time 1 or Time 2; all ts (10) < .89, all ps > .40). This remains the case even if
participants who did not complete the puzzle task are excluded from analyses (all ts (7) < 1.0,
all ps > .40). Table 2 also presents participants’ ratings of task difficulty. A paired samples t
test indicated no significant difference in ratings of task difficulty in the PHA condition
between Time 1 and Time 2, t(5) = 2.00, p = .10. Separate independent samples t tests also
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indicated no significant difference between PHA and PHF conditions at Time 1, and no
significant difference between PHA at Time 2 and PHF at Time 1 (all ts(10) < .83, all ps
> .43). Thus, participants in both the PHA and PHF conditions reported a similar level of
difficulty in completing the puzzle.
These data indicate that the (false) familiarity for the puzzle task reported by
participants in the PHF condition did not lead to faster completion times compared to those in
the PHA condition. However, this sense of (false) familiarity lead to ratings of task difficulty
closest to ratings made by those in the PHA condition at Time 2 (rather than Time 1). In other
words, the sense of (false) familiarity did not translate to a behavioral advantage, but it did
make the task feel slightly easier.
Experiences of Familiarity and Déjà vu
We categorized participants’ reported experiences of familiarity as “strong”, “weak”,
or “none” based on either their spontaneous comments or responses to questions during the
posthypnotic interview. We coded familiarity as “strong” if participants’ comments indicated
a strong, noticeable sense of familiarity for the puzzle game. Such comments included “I feel
like I’ve done it years and years ago” and “I’ve seen it before, I’ve done it before.” We coded
familiarity as “weak” if participants’ comments indicated a weak and not especially
compelling sense of familiarity for the puzzle task. Such comments included “maybe vaguely,
maybe not this exact one, maybe something similar” and “I think I might have seen it before.”
We coded familiarity as “none” if participants denied any sense of familiarity or made no
comments about the puzzle game being familiar.
In the PHA condition, 3 (50.0%) participants experienced a strong sense of familiarity,
2 (33.3%) experienced a weak sense of familiarity, and 1 (16.7%) experienced no sense of
familiarity. In the PHF condition, 4 (66.7%) experienced a strong sense of familiarity, 1
(16.7%) experienced a weak sense of familiarity, and 1 (16.7%) experienced no sense of
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familiarity. There was no difference between the PHA and PHF conditions in their pattern of
experienced familiarity, ² (2, N = 12) = .48, p = .79. Irrespective of the particular
posthypnotic suggestion, more than half of the participants described a strong sense of
familiarity. For instance, one participant commented “I’m trying to work out where I’ve done
that before…it just looks really familiar.”
We categorized participants’ reported experiences of déjà vu in the same way – as
“strong”, “weak”, or “none” based on either their spontaneous comments or responses to
questions during the posthypnotic interview. We coded déjà vu as “strong” if participants’
comments indicated a strong, noticeable, specific sense of déjà vu for the puzzle game. Such
comments included “It was pretty déjà vu…I think I’ve done something similar to it before”
and “I felt like I had done that puzzle before…that exact one.” We coded déjà vu as “weak” if
participants’ comments indicated a weak, non-specific, and not especially compelling sense of
déjà vu for the puzzle game. Such comments included “For some reason I feel like I may have
seen it before or spoken to someone about something similar before.” We coded déjà vu as
“none” if participants denied any sense of déjà vu or made no comments about experiencing
déjà vu for the puzzle game.
In the PHA condition, no participants experienced a strong sense of déjà vu, 3 (50.0%)
experienced a weak sense of déjà vu, and 3 (50.0%) experienced no sense of déjà vu. In the
PHF condition, 5 (83.3%) experienced a strong sense of déjà vu and 1 (16.7%) experienced
no sense of déjà vu. This pattern of experienced déjà vu differed significantly across the PHA
and PHF conditions, ² (2, N = 12) = 9.00, p = .01. That is, the PHF suggestion was more
likely to lead to a strong sense of déjà vu. For instance, one participant in this condition said
“it just feels like I’ve done it before…the feeling of how it slides”; another said “I remember
the different colors and the different parts of the puzzle and the aim of the puzzle, the exit and
the red engine.”
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In analyzing participants’ comments during the posthypnotic inquiry, we coded: (1)
whether their comments about the familiarity of the puzzle game were spontaneous and
unsuggested or made only in response to direct questions from the hypnotist; (2) whether they
explained the experience of familiarity as a consequence of a specific past event (“past event
based”), as a consequence of completing the task during hypnosis (“recent event based”), or
were unsure of the source of familiarity (“unsure”); and (3) whether participants’ sense of
familiarity was free-floating and confused (“confused”) or was readily explained
(“confident”).
Participants in the PHA condition tended not to make spontaneous comments about
the familiarity of the behavioral task (16.7%), and were more likely to explain their
experience of familiarity as a consequence of a specific past event (66.7%); for instance, one
participant said “I just remember it from the next-door neighbours… they’ve got the same
little set”; another said “I had a smaller version of that when I was a kid.” Participants in this
condition also tended to be very confident about the source of their sense of familiarity for the
puzzle game, giving ready explanations such as “because I used to play with it as a kid that’s
why I knew how to do it.” In contrast, the majority of participants in the PHF condition made
spontaneous comments (66.7%) about their sense of familiarity for the puzzle game, yet were
unsure how to explain this familiarity (66.7%). They said things like “I’m trying to work out
where I’ve done that before…it just looks really familiar.” Relatedly, participants in this
condition were much less confident (33.3%) about the source of their sense of familiarity;
they had more difficulty in explaining it. One said “Did we do it in an experiment? I don’t
know…I’ve done that before, I just don’t remember when.”
To illustrate the important differences between the reactions of participants in the
PHA and PHF conditions, following are excerpts from the posthypnotic interview with a male
participant in the PHA condition and a male participant in the PHF condition.
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Response to Posthypnotic Amnesia Suggestion
Hypnotist: What were you thinking and feeling as you were doing that task [puzzle
game]?
Participant: Pretty much every piece would have to move. Every piece has to move
and you have to go backwards before you go forwards.
Hypnotist: And do you have any memory of having seen or done this task before?
Participant: No.
Hypnotist: Did you feel at all familiar with any aspects of the task?
Participant: I’ve done it before when I was a kid. I don’t know if it was that exact
one but it was the same kind of thing.
Hypnotist: And did you notice anything unusual about how you felt when you
were carrying out the task?
Participant: [Participant shakes head and pulls face]
Hypnotist: Could you relate any feelings you experienced during the task to
sensations you may have felt in everyday life?
Participant: Not really, it was just a puzzle that I did.
Hypnotist: Did you experience the sensation of déjà vu at all during the task?
Participant: [Participant shakes head and pulls face] No.
Hypnotist: And did you ever have the feeling you could predict what would
happen next?
Participant: Only after I looked at it and realised where the green one had to go.
Response to Posthypnotic Familiarity Suggestion
Hypnotist: Just tell me what you were thinking and feeling as you were doing the
puzzle task.
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Participant: I think I’ve done something like this before. I dunno…I was just
looking at what had to go where and how it could be manipulated.
Actually, when I first looked at it I thought I wouldn’t expect to finish
it but once I started doing it, it made sense. It was just a bit odd.
Hypnotist: So you told me that you felt as though you had done it before. Tell me
a bit about that.
Participant: It was pretty déjà vu. It seems like a real childhood toy kind of thing. I
think I’ve done something similar to it before.
Hypnotist: Can you tell me when you might have done that?
Participant: I’m not sure. Probably when I was a kid or something.
Hypnotist: Were there any particular aspects of the task that seemed familiar?
Participant: Like the engine…how it feels and how it slides on the board. It just
seems familiar.
Hypnotist: And you mention that it feels like déjà vu…
Participant: Yes.
Hypnotist: Can you tell me a bit about that?
Participant: It just feels like I’ve done it before. The feeling of how it slides over
and stuff. It’s like…it wasn’t a surprise to me how they moved.
Hypnotist: And do you think…
Participant: I think I might have seen it before.
Hypnotist: Was there anything else you were thinking or feeling whilst you were
doing the task?
Participant: I was hoping I would solve it because it would be embarrassing if I
couldn’t…saying it’s like a kid’s thing.
Aspects of Hypnotic Déjà Vu Revealed by the EAT Inquiry
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During the EAT inquiry a number of interesting themes emerged, which also illustrate
differences between the PHA and PHF conditions. These themes surrounded: (1) participants’
interpretations of the suggestion; (2) confusion about the familiarity experienced for the
puzzle game; (3) fascination with the sensory aspects of the puzzle game; (4) breaching of the
posthypnotic amnesia; (5) the relationship between déjà vu in the laboratory and naturally
occurring déjà vu; and (6) task focus.
To explore participants’ interpretation of the suggestion, we asked them to describe
their thoughts and expectations as they listened to the suggestion. While listening to the
suggestion, participants in the PHA condition focused on attempting to forget their initial
completion of the puzzle task. They made comments such as “I was trying to think about how
I would forget about remembering it…I just had to suppress it…think about other things”, and
“I focused on forgetting…I sort of just compiled it and packaged everything that I had
done…then just sort of put it aside in my mind.” Participants in the PHF condition described
attempting to visualize the puzzle, but they were also quite confused about what to expect.
Their comments included: “it was a little bit confusing because she was talking about the red
engine and the exit gate and I had no idea about what the red engine and the exit gate were”,
and “I was imagining something…and it’s hard to imagine something you’ve never seen
before so I was just concentrating on what she said, the fact she’d mentioned the red fire
engine and the fact she’d mentioned the gate.”
During the EAT participants in the PHF condition commented in ways that indicated
they felt confused about the familiarity they felt for the puzzle game. For instance, one said
“A little bit confused because I felt like I knew exactly what I had to do, and I’d done it before,
but it was frustrating that I couldn’t do it”; another said “I remember thinking I’ve seen this
before. Then I remember thinking ‘why?’ Why would I feel like I’ve done this before?”, and a
third said “when she started explaining the rules I was going yeah I know the rules…when?
Déjà vu in the Laboratory 24
24
When did I find this out? When did I? When did I do it?” In contrast, participants in the PHA
condition commented in ways that indicated they were confident, rather than confused, in the
source of the familiarity.
Participants’ EAT comments also suggested a strong sensory fascination. Participants
in the PHF condition in particular appeared to be captured by the sensory features of the
puzzle game, such as the colors of the pieces, the sounds the pieces made when sliding across
the board, and how the pieces felt as they moved. For example, one said: “it just feels like I’ve
done it before….the feeling of how it slides over and stuff”; another said “one of the main
things that stuck out at me was how it felt and how they moved”, and a third said “I
remembered very strongly it was a red engine and it had to go out of the exit and you had to
slide things….and the little carriages in plastic”. In contrast, participants in the PHA condition
tended to focus more on how they were going to complete the puzzle task.
We thought it was possible that re-presenting participants in the PHA condition with
the same puzzle game following hypnosis would breach their posthypnotic amnesia. Indeed,
although these participants did not report any memory of completing the task at Time 1,
during the EAT they commented in ways that suggested some awareness of having done so.
For example, one said: “maybe I did remember doing it and I was trying not to remember for
the sake of the suggestion”; another said “I remembered that I did it before but I couldn’t
remember how I did it.” Thus, the familiarity reported by 5 participants in this condition (3
strong, 2 weak) may reflect in part, breaching of the posthypnotic amnesia.
During the EAT, we also asked participants whether they could relate any feelings
they experienced during the puzzle game to sensations they experienced in everyday life. This
question was intended to explore whether déjà vu in the laboratory was experientially similar
to déjà vu in everyday life. Participants in the PHA condition either said that they did not
experience déjà vu for the puzzle or said that their experience with the puzzle was much less
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compelling than the déjà vu that they’ve experienced in their everyday lives. For instance, one
said “with déjà vu (that occurs naturally) it usually hits me straight away…like ooh I know
this. This (experiment) was more like have I or haven’t I … not as strong.” In contrast,
participants in the PHF condition commented in ways that suggested that the déjà vu they
experienced for the puzzle was similar to the déjà vu they’ve experienced in their everyday
lives. For instance, one said “It was like most of the déjà vus I have because I can really lose
myself in déjà vu…it felt like I had done it before”; another said “I recognised the parts, I
remembered how I saw it…it felt comforting and familiar.” One participant in this condition
claimed that her experience of déjà vu was so compelling that she felt she could predict what
would happen next. She said “I felt as though I had power and knowledge and confidence…I
thought I was on top of the problem.”
Finally, based on participants’ descriptions during the EAT of how they went about
completing the puzzle game, two raters coded their focus as being either “sensory focus”
where they focused on the sensory aspects of the game such as the colors of the pieces or the
sound of the pieces sliding, “event focus” where they focused on a past event involving the
puzzle game, or “strategic focus” where they focused on solving the puzzle. Participants could
be coded as having more than one of these types of focus. In the PHA condition, 16.7% of
participants were coded as having a sensory focus, 33.3% were coded as having an event
focus and 66.7% were coded as having a strategic focus. In the PHF condition, 66.7% were
coded as having a sensory focus, 16.7% were coded as having an event focus and 66.7% were
coded as having a strategic focus. Thus, more participants in the PHF condition compared to
the PHA condition focused on the sensory aspects of the puzzle game as illustrated by their
comments indicating sensory fascination. In both the PHA and PHF condition, many
participants were also focused on completing the puzzle game. This strategic focus is
illustrated by comments including “when I was doing the puzzle task I was just trying to focus
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on getting it done”, and “I thought why is it that this feels really familiar…but I was kind of
more focusing on how I was going to solve the puzzle.”
Discussion
This experiment is one of only a handful to attempt to capture the mysterious, fleeting
sensation of déjà vu in the laboratory (e.g., Banister & Zangwill, 1941; O’Connor, Moulin, &
Conway, 2007). It is the first to compare two potential hypnotic analogues of déjà vu based on
suggestions for posthypnotic amnesia and posthypnotic familiarity. Both suggestions were
successful: participants who received the amnesia suggestion reported no memory of
completing the puzzle game (for the first time) during hypnosis; participants who received the
familiarity suggestion reported that the puzzle game (which they completed for the first time
after hypnosis) felt familiar. However, these suggestions lead to quite different “déjà vu”
experiences.
According to Brown (2004), déjà vu involves “an objective assessment of
unfamiliarity juxtaposed with a subjective evaluation of familiarity” (p. 2). Whereas our
posthypnotic familiarity suggestion created an analogue consistent with this understanding of
déjà vu, our posthypnotic amnesia suggestion did not. Focusing first on the PHA condition,
five of the six participants in this condition passed the suggestion, and five of the six reported
(either strong or weak) feelings of familiarity for the puzzle game. However, only three of the
six experienced a sense of déjà vu; these feelings were weak and only reported in response to
questioning from the experimenter. These percentages and reported experiences are consistent
with Banister and Zangwill’s (1941) findings. Like these earlier data, the results from our
PHA condition are best interpreted in terms of source amnesia or breaching of the amnesia.
Although during the posthypnotic inquiry participants in the PHA condition reported no
complete, explicit memory of completing the task at Time 1, they did indicate familiarity for
the task during the EAT inquiry. These participants experienced true familiarity for a recently
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experienced, but (totally or partially) forgotten event. Some participants confidently attributed
this familiarity to an earlier event in their lives, which is more akin to the phenomenon of
source amnesia (where information learned during hypnosis is recalled following hypnosis
but the source of that information, the hypnotic context, is forgotten; Evans, 1979; Evans &
Thorne, 1966). Other participants attributed this familiarity to an increasing recognition (over
the course of the inquiry) that they may have completed the puzzle game during hypnosis,
which is more akin to the phenomenon of breaching (where posthypnotic amnesia is partially
or completely reversed (“breached”) before the cancellation cue in response to cues to the
forgotten material or social/motivational demands; Coe, 1996). Overall, the experiences of
participants in the PHA condition seemed quite unlike déjà vu experiences in everyday life.
In contrast, the PHF condition, which we based on earlier work by O’Connor et al.
(2007), was more successful in mapping everyday déjà vu. Five of the six participants in this
condition passed the suggestion, and five of the six reported (either strong or weak) feelings
of familiarity for the puzzle game. Most importantly, five of the six experienced a sense of
déjà vu; these feelings were strong and often reported spontaneously. The comments of these
participants, highlighted by our use of detailed posthypnotic and EAT inquires, suggested that
their déjà vu experiences were characterised by perceptual salience and confusion, very
similar to déjà vu “in the wild”. Specifically, participants given the posthypnotic familiarity
suggestion talked often about the sensory features of the puzzle game – the feeling of the
pieces sliding, the sound of them moving and the color of the engine. They also indicated that
they were confused about why the game felt so familiar; they struggled to work out whether
and when they might have experienced it before, much like in everyday déjà vu.
By adopting a cognitive neuropsychological approach and focusing on a select group
of high hypnotisable individuals, our findings suggest that posthypnotic familiarity is a viable
method for creating and investigating déjà vu in the laboratory. This approach has allowed us
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to establish a hypnotic paradigm for investigating déjà vu and provides a framework for future
research using a larger sample size. This success adds to other recent contributions of
instrumental hypnosis including, for instance, investigations of functional amnesia, functional
blindness, delusions, auditory hallucinations, pain, and disorders of motor control (Barnier,
2002; Barnier & McConkey, 1999; Blakemore, Oakley, & Frith, 2003; Cox & Bryant, in
press; Bryant & McConkey, 1989a, 1989b; Cox & Barnier, 2003; Halligan et al., 2000;
Rainville et al., 1997; Woody & Szechtman, 2000; Zimbardo et al., 1981). However, there are
limitations to this laboratory analogue that we need to acknowledge and address in future
research.
First, in this experiment, the target of our suggestions – the object of déjà vu – was a
puzzle game. A number of participants noted that their everyday experiences of déjà vu more
commonly involve places and situations, rather than particular tasks (consistent with findings
from retrospective reports; e.g., Brown, Porter, & Nix, 1994). Although focusing a
posthypnotic familiarity suggestion on a more general place or situation, rather than a specific,
time-limited task such as the puzzle game, may require a little ingenuity and pilot testing on
the part of the experimenter, hypnosis research in related areas gives us reason to hope that
suggestions for more complex events and stimuli would be equally successful. For instance,
in a recent program of research, Barnier and her colleagues have extended posthypnotic
amnesia for simple word lists to complex, emotional autobiographical memories (Barnier,
2002; Barnier & McConkey, 1999; Barnier, McConkey, & Wright, 2004; Cox & Barnier,
2003).
Second, one participant claimed that her laboratory experience of suggested déjà vu
was different to everyday déjà vu because she was convinced that she had done the puzzle
task before, whereas in everyday déjà vu she is sure that she has not previously experienced
the situation. Although most participants denied ever seeing the puzzle before, we did not
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control for whether they may have completed a similar task at some stage in their lives.
However, it is more likely that in this case, the suggestion of familiarity (to a highly
hypnotizable person) was almost too successful in that it diminished one vital component of
déjà vu: the awareness that the familiarity was false. Thus, to accurately model déjà vu we
need to balance the success of the suggestion for (false) familiarity with intact source
monitoring (that the felt familiarity is indeed false).
Third, and more generally, a number of participants commented that the déjà vu they
experienced in response to the posthypnotic familiarity suggestion was not as strong as déjà
vu “in the wild”. This may have been due to the demands of the puzzle game. Two thirds of
participants commented in ways that indicated they maintained a strong focus on completing
the puzzle. Focusing on the task may have drawn attention away from the anomalous
sensation of false familiarity. When people experience déjà vu in everyday life, the sensation
typically captures their attention; they often pause to examine this internal state (comparing
the feeling they are experiencing with their knowledge of the accuracy of the feeling).
Participants’ focus on completing the puzzle game may have meant that relatively few
attentional resources were available to focus on the sensation of déjà vu itself. Indeed, it is an
interesting question whether déjà vu or déjà vecu might be “treated” by an attentional
manipulation that directs the focus away from the internal, false familiarity state. For the
purposes of this research, we may be able to generate an even closer analogue of everyday
déjà vu by focusing posthypnotic familiarity on a task, situation or event that requires less
attention and thus allows for greater introspection should déjà vu arise.
Although strong inferences from this experiment must await additional work with
larger groups and appropriate controls (e.g., the real-simulating paradigm could be usefully
implemented to explore the social and contextual demands of hypnotically elicited déjà vu;
Orne, 1959, 1962), our findings suggest that hypnosis is a useful technique for creating and
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studying déjà vu in the laboratory. Further development of this technique should compare its
ability to model the “surface features” of déjà vu (as demonstrated in this experiment by
reports of compelling familiarity, sensory fascination, and confusion about the source of the
familiarity) with its ability to model the processes that drive déjà vu (e.g., dissociations
between memory and familiarity and the involvement of the medial temporal lobe; Aggleton
& Brown, 1999; Brown, 2004; Vignal et al., 2007; for a discussion of hypnotic models of
surface features vs. processes, see Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988). Laying this issue aside, a
hypnotic analogue of déjà vu offers a novel way to advance our understanding of its
disruptive and debilitating clinical form -- déjà vecu. Currently, the only method for
investigating déjà vecu is via neuropsychological case studies; there is no experimental
analogue that reliably elicits feelings of false familiarity that have behavioral consequences.
And there is very little understanding of the links between déjà vu and déjà vecu. In future
work we plan to examine the role of belief formation and evaluation in déjà vu and match this
to clinical cases of déjà vecu. We also hope to explore potential interventions for déjà vecu by
challenging hypnotically suggested déjà vu and examining the impact of distraction
techniques and/or self-monitoring training on reported déjà vu sensations.
Overall, this experiment offers more evidence of the instrumental value of hypnosis.
In using hypnotic techniques to create déjà vu in the laboratory, we are developing the means
by which researchers might finally be able to explore this common, yet elusive phenomenon
in a systematic and reliable way.
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Footnotes
1The 10-item modified HGSHS:A included: head falling, eye closure, hand lowering,
finger lock, moving hands together, communication inhibition, experiencing of fly, eye
catelepsy, posthypnotic suggestion, and posthypnotic amnesia; arm rigidity and arm
immobilization items were removed to ensure that the procedure could be conducted within
the time limits of a 1 hour class. The 10-item tailored SHSS:C included: hand lowering,
moving hands apart, mosquito hallucination, taste hallucination, arm rigidity, dream, age
regression, arm immobilization, negative visual hallucination, and posthypnotic amnesia;
anosmia and auditory hallucination items were removed to ensure that the procedure could be
conducted within the time limits of a 1 hour individual session.
²Two independent raters scored participants’ transcripts. Interrater reliability was
80.3%. Disagreements, which tended to be of degree rather than of kind (especially since
participants’ comments during the posthypnotic inquiry and EAT inquiry sometimes were
different) were resolved by discussion.
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Table 1
Summary of Experimental Design
Experimental Groups
Posthypnotic Amnesia Posthypnotic Familiarity
Hypnosis Procedure Induction
Standard Suggestions
Induction
Standard Suggestions
Hypnotic Puzzle Game
(1)
Posthypnotic Amnesia
Suggestion
Familiarity
Suggestion
Deinduction Deinduction
Posthypnotic Interview Posthypnotic Puzzle
Game (2)
Posthypnotic Puzzle
Game (1)
Cancellation Cancellation
EAT Inquiry Discussion of Hypnotic
Puzzle Game (1)
Discussion of Suggestion Discussion of Suggestion
Discussion of Posthypnotic
Puzzle Game (2)
Discussion of Posthypnotic
Puzzle Game (1)
Déjà vu in the Laboratory 40
40
Table 2
Performance and Ratings on Puzzle Game
PHA PHF
Time 1
(Hypnotic
Puzzle Game)
Time 2
(Posthypnotic
Puzzle Game)
Time 1
(Posthypnotic Puzzle Game)
Completed 4 (66.7%) 6 (100.0%) 5 (83.3%)
Time 94.57 (69.89) 48.84 (28.43) 74.60 (65.18)
Task Difficulty 3.83 (1.83) 2.50 (1.38) 2.83 (2.32)
Note: Task Difficulty ratings were made on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means extremely easy
and 7 means extremely difficult. For Time and Task Difficulty, standard deviations are in
parentheses.
